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Abstract 
 
 
The widespread opposition to unprecedented austerity measures in Greece 
provides a unique opportunity to study the causes of mass protest. We report the 
results of a survey of the adult population, with two thirds of the respondents 
supporting protest and 29 per cent reporting actual involvements in strikes and/or 
demonstrations during 2010. Relative deprivation is a significant predictor of 
potential protest but does not play any role in terms of who actually takes part in 
strikes or demonstrations. Previous protest participation emerges as a key 
predictor of actual protest. We attempt to set these results in the context of Greece 
as compared with other countries facing similar challenges and discuss the 
implications for the future of austerity politics. 
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Introduction 
From the Arab Spring to the Occupy Wall Street movement, the Chilean student 
GHPRQVWUDWLRQVDQGWKHHQYLURQPHQWDOSURWHVWVRI*HUPDQµ:XWEUJHU¶DQJU\
citizens), a new wave of protest is spreading around the world that might even be 
compared with 1848 or 1968.
1
 One of the key contributors to this wave is 
opposition to austerity policies adopted by several governments following the 
economic and financial crises of the late 2000s. Given the wide spread of issues 
addressed and political contexts in which protests take place, the question arises 
how similar these new protest movements really are. To what extent do these 
movements constitute a new protest culture?
2
 The rise of austerity movements in 
particular appears to challenge the dominant frame for the analysis of protest 
EHKDYLRXULQ:HVWHUQ(XURSHZKLFKKDVIRFXVHGRQWKHULVHRIµQHZSROLWLFV¶DQG
DVVRFLDWHGµQHZVRFLDOPRYHPHQWV¶DGGUHVVLQJLVVXHVVXFKDVWKHHQYLURQPHQWDQG
peace. The main protagonists of these movements were generations socialized in 
affluent post-ZDUHFRQRPLHVKROGLQJµSRVW-PDWHULDOLVWYDOXHV¶3 Anti-austerity 
SURWHVWVRQWKHRWKHUKDQGIRFXVRQµPDWHULDO¶LVVXHVVXFKDVFXWVLQSXEOLF
expenditure, unemployment and inequality.  Such protests could thus be expected 
WRILWZKDW+DUROG5.HUERWHUPHGµPRYHPHQWVRIFULVLV¶LQFRQWUDVWWR
µPRYHPHQWVRIDIIOXHQFH¶4 A key question for understanding the recent 
                                                 
1
 Stiglitz 2012; Mason 2012; Castells 2012; Kraushaar 2012.  
2
 Hartleb 2011. 
3 Inglehart 1977; Barnes and Kaase et al. 1979. 
4
 Kerbo 1982. 
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mobilization against austerity is whether it represents a further manifestation of 
the impact RIµQHZVRFLDOPRYHPHQWV¶RULVLQGLFDWLYHRIDGLIIHUHQWSURWHVWFXOWXUH
WKDWLVPRUHDNLQWRµROG¶UDWKHUWKDQµQHZ¶SROLWLFV 
 
While anti-austerity protest can be found in many countries, the sovereign debt 
crisis in the Eurozone that accelerated in 2010 provides a specific focus. The 
country at the forefront of this development is Greece. To prevent a disorderly 
default on its debt, in May 2010 the socialist PASOK government negotiated the 
largest loan ever received by a single country (¼10 billion) in return for a 
draconian structural adjustment programme. Greece was of course not the only 
one to experience acute economic problems and be forced to adopt austerity 
policies. Spain, Italy, and Portugal in Southern Europe, as well as Ireland and the 
UK, among others, also found themselves in similar positions. However, anti-
austerity protest appears to have been, at least thus far, much more intense in 
Greece than elsewhere, including in comparison to those countries that have also 
had to resort to international financial rescues. 
 
The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it seeks to understand the determinants 
of anti-austerity protest in Greece in a comparative context, analysing the socio-
political profile of protesters and the mechanisms through which they got 
mobilized in 2010. Despite the prevalence of strikes and demonstrations in 
*UHHFH¶VSROLWLFDOODQGVFDSHWKHUHLVDVFDUFLW\RIHPSLULFDOUHVHDUFKRQWKH
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individual and collective drivers of participation in protest activity.
5
 Is there 
something specific about Greece that explains its higher level of mobilization 
compared to other countries or is it a precursor of things to come elsewhere? 
Secondly, this paper seeks to map the characteristics of the anti-austerity 
movement engaging with broader theoretical debates about the determinants of 
participation in protest. In particular, given the centrality of economic hardship in 
WKHDXVWHULW\GHEDWHWRZKDWH[WHQWLVWKHWKHRU\RIµUHODWLYHGHSULYDWLRQ¶DEOHWR
make a return to the fore of political behaviour, when tested against other classic 
theories, such as resource mobilization and rational choice approaches? 
 
Crucially, the huge size and frequency of demonstrations and general strikes in 
Greece offers a unique opportunity to study protest behaviour through the analysis 
of individual-level data collected with the help of a general population survey. We 
conducted a survey of the Greek adult population in December 2010. Of 1014 
people interviewed, 302 (29 per cent) stated that they had engaged in protest, a 
sizeable minority of the entire population. Unlike surveys of demonstrators, this 
survey gives us data on both participants and non-participants of a particular type 
of political protest. Furthermore, unlike many previous studies of political protest, 
this survey is about the engagement of individuals in a specific protest movement 
                                                 
5
 Typically, studies of protest behaviour in Greece are qualitative. For example, see 
Economides and Monastiriotis 2009; Pechtelidis 2011. One interesting exception is a 
study reporting the results of various laboratory experiments conducted in the context 
of the 2008 riots, see Hugh-Jones, Katsanidou and Richter 2011.  
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and actions that preceded the data gathering process by days, weeks or, at most, 
months. This will allow us first to scrutinize opposition to austerity policies and 
support for protest action before exploring who out of this pool of potential 
protesters ends up taking part in actual protests.  
 
The paper argues that to explain the phenomenon of anti-austerity protest, we 
need to take adequate account of both the aggregate context at the national level 
and its dynamic interrelationship with drivers of mobilization at the individual 
level. It thus begins with a brief overview of Greek protest culture, which informs 
the subsequent theorization about the individual drivers of protest and helps us 
generate relevant hypotheses. The collection of data is then discussed, followed 
by a presentation of the main findings and their theoretical and empirical 
implications for austerity politics. In the overall analysis, we will examine to what 
extent the economic circumstances of the austerity crisis or the political context of 
a highly-developed protest culture are the primary drivers of anti-austerity protest 
in Greece. As we shall demonstrate, relative deprivation plays an important role to 
define protest potential but socialization into taking particular forms of political 
action through prior protest involvement is an essential component of explaining 
who actually protests. 
 
Protest in Greece: Contextual Factors 
According to Charles Tilly, protest behaviour cannot be seen as simply reactive or 
spontaneous or fully understood by looking at individual level influences alone. 
7 
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3URWHVWUHSHUWRLUHV7LOO\DUJXHVµDUHOHDUQHGFXOWXUDOFUHDWLRQV¶6, which carry a 
different meaning and whose parameters are defined by a shared culture that 
structures relationships of power and resistance. A range of related concepts have 
been employed to analyse the nation-specific political context of protest 
EHKDYLRXULQFOXGLQJPHQWDOLWLHVµSROLWLFDOFXOWXUHV¶DQGµFROOHFWLYHDFWLRQ
IUDPHV¶7 What these highlight is that the intensity and character of protest is 
historically contingent and dependent on a specific socio-political context, which 
may explain why there is greater protest mobilization in some countries than in 
others. To understand the drivers of anti-austerity protest in Greece, we thus have 
to first look at the particular national setting in which the movement developed.  
 
Contentious politics evolved in Greece as a result of historical struggles, which 
gradually stretched the boundaries of permissible expression of social demands 
through protest in a way that undermined state authority and glorified resistance 
to government policies.
8
 A critical juncture to the development of this protest 
culture in modern Greek history can be traced to the student opposition against 
the military junta that ruled between 1967 and 1974. The uprising in the 
Polytechnic on 17 November 1973 is identified in popular discourse as the reason 
IRUWKHUHJLPH¶VFROODSVHDQGWKe return to democracy a year later. The ensuing 
romanticized vision of collective action, amplified by a widespread suspicion 
                                                 
6
 Tilly 1995, 26. 
7
 Tarrow 1992. 
8
 Andronikidou and Kovras 2012.  
8 
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against any attempts by the authorities to impose stricter internal security controls 
in a nation that had experienced excessive police brutality during the junta, 
provide fertile ground for new movements to elicit legitimacy and sympathy.
9
 
Consequently, various forms of protest, such as the widespread practice of school 
occupations and the partisan activism of university student politics, have been 
institutionalized and are widely reproduced in social and political life.
10
  
 
The ideology of the groups that led the resistance against the military junta places 
them at the left of the spectrum. Despite their small size, many extra-
parliamentary leftist groups, along with various anarchist groups, continued their 
µVWUXJJOHV¶DIWHUWKHWUDQVLWLRQWRGHPRFUDF\SOD\LQJOHDGLQJUROHVLQDOPRVWDOO
the social movements that emerged since.
11
 The socialist PASOK government in 
the 1980s was, to an extent, able to contain some of the most militant parts of 
WKHVHPRYHPHQWVµE\SURPLVLQJWRFKDQJHVRFLHW\IURPDERYH¶12 and forming 
close relationships with the trade unions that organize the majority of protests.
13
 
Meanwhile, parliamentary parties of the Left, notably the Greek Communist Party 
(KKE) and later the Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza), actively encouraged 
collective action but were unable to capitalize in electoral terms on the left-wing 
                                                 
9
 Karyotis 2007. 
10
 Lyrintzis 2011; Andronikidou and Kovras 2012. 
11
 Kassimeris 2005. Kanellopoulos 2012. 
12
 Lountos 2012. 
13
 Mavrogordatos 1997. 
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orientation of protests prior to the May/June elections of 2012.
14
 Successive 
working class struggles in Greece are thus, according to Lountos, not a 
PDQLIHVWDWLRQRIWKHRUJDQL]HG/HIW¶VXQLI\LQJUROHEXWUDWKHUWKHSURGXFWRI
VXVWDLQHGDFWLYLW\RIµDOD\HURIPLOLWDQWDQGUDGLFDOPLQRULWLHV¶ZKRVHLQIOXHQce 
is disproportionately high in the specific context and protest culture within which 
they operate.
15
  
 
A recent example identified in the literature as a manifestation of the influence of 
a Greek protest culture were the violent demonstrations and riots that followed the 
shooting of a 15-year old student by a police officer in December 2008.
16
 It is 
difficult, however, to establish a link between such an alleged µprotest culture¶ 
and protest events without data on the protesters. Although the historical narrative 
above suggests such protest culture in Greece, we need cross-national data to 
assess whether this leads to a greater propensity for protest compared to other 
countries facing similar conditions that could motivate protest.  
 
Reliable data on past protest behaviour is difficult to come by. One popular 
approach among social movement scholars has been the analysis of protest events 
                                                 
14
 Left-wing parties did not until 2012 pose any direct challenge against the two major 
parties, PASOK and New Democracy, which took turns to run the country after 1974. 
Cf. Lyrintzis 2011, for a recent assessment.  
15
 Lountos 2012, 187.  
16
 Lountos 2012.  
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based on media reports. Comparing the yearly mean of protest events between 
1990 and 1995 calculated by Nam
17
 on the basis of the Protest and Coercion 
dataset,
18
 Greece with 224.17 events came way behind countries such as France, 
Spain and Italy. However, if one takes into account the different population 
sizes,
19
 Greece with 21.3 protest events per million inhabitants ranks at the same 
level as France (21.7) and above Spain (14.0), Portugal (6.9) and Italy (6.0), 
although well behind Ireland (75.1).  
 
Comparative data from population surveys may provide some clues on the 
number of people that were actually involved in protest activities. The European 
Values Survey has asked since 1981 about participation in a range of political 
DFWLRQVLQFOXGLQJµDWWHQGLQJODZIXOGHPRQVWUDWLRQV¶EXW*UHHFHZDVRQO\
involved in just two studies, in 1999 and 2008.
20
 In 1999, a staggering 48 per cent 
                                                 
17
 Nam 2007. 
18
 European Protest and Coercion Data, compiled by Ron Francisco 
http://web.ku.edu/~ronfran/data/, accessed 10 March 2012.  
19
 2ZQ FDOFXODWLRQV EDVHG RQ 1DP¶V  GDWD DQG  SRSXODWLRQ VL]H GDWD
obtained from the US census website, 
http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php, 
accessed 10 March 2012.  
20
 Own analysis of European Values Study data, 1981-2008; design weight applied. 
European Values Study Longitudinal Data File 1981-2008 (Cologne, Germany: 
GESIS Data Archive, 2011) [ZA4804 Data file Version 2.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.11005]. 
11 
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of Greek respondents claimed to have taken part in a demonstration at some point 
in their lives; by 2008, this figure had fallen to 24 per cent. The 1999 figure was 
the highest figure ever recorded in the European Values Survey ± France coming 
closest with 46 per cent in 2008± and could thus be seen as evidence of an 
exceptionally strong protest culture. However, the 1999 figure appears to be a 
reflection of specific factors applying at the time. Apart from a high level of 
protest against the military dictatorship in the 1970s, the 1990s also saw mass 
protest on a huge scale, in particular the movement on the Macedonian issue in 
which protest was actively supported by all political forces.
21
 The 2008 figure of 
24 per cent, immediately preceding the 2010 protests, brought Greece back in line 
with other Southern European countries that have always displayed a rather high 
preponderance for protest behaviour, in particular Italy (2009: 38 per cent) and 
Spain (2008: 39 per cent).  
 
More recent figures were collected by the European Social Survey (ESS) since 
ZLWKDTXHVWLRQRQSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQµODZIXO¶GHPRQVWUDWLRQVLQWKHODVW
                                                                                                                                                             
For more information on the EVS study, see http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.org, 
accessed 26 March 2012. 
21
 Two mass demonstrations took place in 1992, among others, in Athens and in 
Thessaloniki, with the participation of 1.3 and 1 million people respectively; see 
Danforth 1995, and (XURSHDQ3URWHVWDQG&RHUFLRQ'DWDµ*UHHFH-¶ILOH 
12 
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months.
22
 The results for Greece and a host of other countries affected by the 
austerity crisis are plotted in Figure 1. These confirm the slowing down of protest 
in Greece, as far as demonstrations were concerned in the 2000s, a period of 
economic growth and prosperity, during which Spain and Italy had a higher share 
of protesters. 
 
--- Figure 1 about here ---- 
 
On the other hand, Greece clearly stands out from others when considering 
general strikes, which are largely absent from the repertoire of trade union actions 
in Northern Europe, including Ireland and the UK, and are uncommon in 
Southern Europe but had become a regular feature of Greek life well before the 
austerity protests. Back in the early 1990s, there were multiple general strikes in 
protest against welfare retrenchment and cuts.
23
 Over the last ten years, there has 
been at least one general strike called in Greece per year (except in 2003), 
peaking at seven in both 2010 and 2011 (see Table 1). The role of trade unions is 
crucial here, as they are responsible for calling the strikes. Although figures on 
trade union membership do not suggest that Greece is as a particularly radicalized 
                                                 
22
 European Social Survey Rounds 1-5, Data file editions 6.2 (Round 1), 3.2 (Round 
2), 3.3 (Round 4), 4.0 (Round 5), 2.0 (Round 6) (Oslo: Norwegian Social Science 
Data Services ± Data Archive and Distributor of ESS Data, 2002-2010).  
23
 Cf. European Protest and Coercion Data. 
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society,
24
 case studies have shown that unions have maintained a high degree of 
organizational cohesion and activism.
25
 
 
--- Table 1 about here --- 
 
In terms of the economic outlook for Greece, the comparative data are fairly 
devastating; on all macro-economic indicators such as gross national product, 
unemployment and gross national debt, Greece was doing worse than other 
countries hit by the sovereign debt crisis.
26
 This has severely impacted on 
individual citizens who are most pessimistic in their self-evaluations of their 
economic circumstances, a sentiment captured in Eurobarometer surveys, plotted 
in Figure 2. Since early 2010, Greeks perceive themselves to face the toughest 
                                                 
24
 According to OECD statistics, trade union density in 2008 was 24 per cent in 
Greece, compared to 32.2 in Ireland , 33.4 in Italy, 20.5 in Portugal, 15 per cent in 
Spain and 27.1 in the UK; http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=UN_DEN, 
accessed 11 April 2012.  
25
 Kretsos 2011. 
26
 With 5 per cent negative growth and its national debt estimated to over 160 per cent 
of its GDP in 2011, Greece topped all indicators of deprivation, with the exception of 
XQHPSOR\PHQWZKHUHLWZDVVHFRQGWR6SDLQ¶VSHUFHQWUDWH6HHFRPSDUDWLYHGDWD
in IMF World Economic Outlook, available at http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm, 
accessed 5 April 2012. 
14 
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economic conditions, with more than 60 per cent considering their economic 
SRVLWLRQVWREHµUDWKHUEDG¶DQGµYHU\EDG¶ 
 
 
---Figure 2 about here ---- 
 
 
The overall analysis of patterns of activity suggests that Greece has some 
similarities with Spain and Italy, with which they also share an authoritarian past, 
and stark differences with others, including Ireland, Portugal and the UK. The 
combination of media reports and population survey data show that Greece has a 
group of activists that generate a lot of protest events that can occasionally 
mobilize a sizeable number of people. Furthermore, while the socio-political 
context illustrates the presence of left-leaning protest culture in Greece, not all of 
major past protest events are linked to radical left-wing politics, while the number 
of people mobilized greatly exceeds the electoral support radical left-parties have 
received (before 2012). These imply that there is a large reservoir of people who 
have been engaged in protest before and who any protest mobilization in Greece 
may be able to draw on. Therefore, in our analysis of individual-level 
determinants of participation in the anti-austerity movement, we will need to pay 
specific attention to these contextual factors, particularly previous protest 
participation, which may play an important role in accounting for involvement in 
protest activities in 2010. Another contextual factor that sets Greece apart is the 
15 
This is the peer-reviewed, accepted author manuscript of the following article: Rüdig, W & Karyotis, G 2014, 'Who protests in Greece? Mass 
opposition to austerity' British Journal of Political Science, vol 44, no. 3, pp. 487-513., http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123413000112  
depth of the economic hardship experienced. This reinforces the idea that any 
attempt to explain protest participation should consider the possible impact of 
factors linked to economic deprivation. 
 
 
Theorizing Individual Drivers of Protest 
Many different theories have been discussed for the explanation of who becomes 
involved in protest behaviour, with some more or less fashionable at different 
times. Considering the widespread, detrimental impact of the crisis on 
LQGLYLGXDOV¶FLUFXPVWDQFHVDVZHOODVWKHVXGGHQQHVVLQZKLFKJULHYDQFHVZHUH
imposed,
27
 the first group of factors that we should investigate focuses on the idea 
of protest as a response to injustice and deprivation. This is one of the oldest 
theories of protest and revolution and an important element of Marxist debate 
since the 19
th
 century. In the 1940s and 1950s, the empirical analysis of social 
behaviour generated a major refinement of the theory. A range of studies 
VXJJHVWHGWKDWWKHµDEVROXWH¶OHYHORIGHSULYDWLRQVXFKDVSRYHUW\DQGLQHTXDOLW\
was not linked to protest behaviour; other factors needed to be present. This led to 
WKHWKHRU\RIµUHODWLYHGHSULYDWLRQ¶ZKLFKIRFXVHGRQDUDQJHRIRWKHUFRnditions 
QHFHVVDU\WRWXUQWKHVWLPXOXVRIµDEVROXWH¶GHSULYDWLRQLQWRDFWLYHSURWHVW7KH
PRVWLPSRUWDQWDVSHFWLQ7HG5REHUW*XUU¶VLQIOXHQWLDOPRGHOZKLFKLQFOXGHG
                                                 
27
 2Q WKH FRQFHSW RI µVXGGHQO\ LPSRVHG JULHYDQFHV¶ SURYLGLQJ D VSXU WR WKH
recruitment of protest participants, cf. Walsh 1981. 
16 
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QXPHURXVRWKHULQWHUYHQLQJYDULDEOHVZDVWKDWWKHµGHSULYDWLRQ¶KDGWREH
perceived as µGHSULYLQJ¶LQUHODWLRQWRZKDWDQLQGLYLGXDOIHHOVWREHHQWLWOHGWR28  
 
Relative deprivation, however, fell out of fashion in the 1970s. One key reason 
was its apparent inability to explain individual involvement in as well as the size 
of protest events, such as the black ghetto riots in US towns in the 1960s.
29
 There 
appeared to be a widespread consensus in the academic community analysing 
social movements by the 1980s and 1990s to reject relative deprivation theory and 
turn to rival explanations,
30
 with only social psychologists continuing to express 
support for it.
31
 More recently, relative deprivation models were used in analyses 
of various forms of political behaviour, such as turnout in elections,
32
 protest 
potential,
33
 and past protest behaviour,
34
 generally confirming the lack of 
explanatory value of the theory.
 
 
 
The anti-austerity movement in Greece, which appears to be chiefly motivated by 
DµGHSULYDWLRQ¶W\SHVWLPXOXVRIIHUVDQLGHDOVHWWLQJWRWHVWWKHWKHRU\:KLOHWKHUH
                                                 
28
 Gurr 1970. 
29
 Brush 1996. 
30
 Gurney and Tierney 1982. 
31
  Crosby1976; Walker and Smith 2002. 
32
 Clarke et al. 2004, 237-40. 
33
 Sanders et al. 2004. 
34
 Dalton, van Sickle and Weldon 2009.  
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are no detailed data on how each individual is affected by the measures, our 
survey is able to capture the level of deprivation by asking respondents a number 
of questions about their past and future economic situation. This allows us to 
measure the perception of the size of the economic deprivation, which could be 
VHHQDVDQDSSUR[LPDWLRQRIWKHµIHOW¶GHSULYDWLRQWKDWLVDNH\SUHGLFWRURISURWHVW 
 
Apart from the actual experience of economic hardship, an essential element of 
GHSULYDWLRQWKHRU\LQYROYHVDVSHFWVRIµIDLUQHVV¶DQGµEODPHDWWULEXWLRQ¶
&RQGLWLRQVZLOOQRWEHSHUFHLYHGDVµGHSULYLQJ¶XQOHVVLQGLYLGXDOVSHUFHLYHWKDW
they are treated unfairly and are not themselves to blame for their situation. 
Within the Greek political discourse on austerity, issues of fairness and blame 
play an important role. A broad range of actors such as financial institutions, both 
international and domestic, and other foreign bodies such as the EU, Germany, or 
µJOREDOL]DWLRQ¶LQJHQHUDOKDYHEHHQKHOGDFFRXQWDEOH:KLOHDOOVLGHVDSSHDUWR
share some elements of blame attribution, the main division lines between 
proponents and opponents concern questions about the effectiveness and fairness 
of the policies proposed. We would thus expect a perception of unfairness to play 
an important role in the decision to protest. Furthermore, relative deprivation 
WKHRU\ZRXOGVXJJHVWWKDWWKRVHDGRSWLQJDQµLQWHUQDO¶EODPHDWWULEXWLRQIRU
example, unemployed people blaming themselves for their inability to find a job, 
are less likely to protest.
35
 The test of relative deprivation theory would thus 
                                                 
35
 Cf. Walker, Wong, and Kretzschmar 2002. 
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involve a range of variables that measure economic experiences and perceptions, 
as well as considerations of unfairness and blame.  
 
Historically, relative deprivation theory was replaced as the dominant theory of 
protest in the 1960s and 1970s by approaches focusing on the resources of 
individuals. If we are going to test whether relative deprivation makes an 
independent contribution to the explanation of protest in the context of the 
extreme austerity situation that applied in Greece in 2010, a first group of 
YDULDEOHVWKDWZHQHHGWRFRQWUROIRUDUHGHILQHGE\µUHVRXUFHV¶:LWKLQSROLWLFDO
science, the earliest major empirical study aiming to cover the entire range of 
political actions taken in the USA promoted resource-based explanations of 
behaviour.
36
 People participated in politics who had the resources to do so; this 
placed variables such as education, occupation and income - WKHµVRFLR-economic 
VWDWXV¶6(6- at the centre of the analysis.  
 
+RZFDQZHDGDSWµUHVRXUFH¶EDVHGWKHRULHVRIVRFLDOSURWHVWWRWKH*UHHN
situation? We propose to concentrate on two types of resource based variables, 
QDPHO\µELRJUDSKLFDODYDLODELOLW\¶DQGµVRFLDOQHWZRUNV¶)LUVWZHFDQHDVLO\WHVW
a basic model of political participatiRQZLWKUHIHUHQFHWRYDULDEOHVRIµELRJUDSKLFDO
DYDLODELOLW\¶37 of individuals, such as age, gender, marital status, caring for 
children, and education. Protest behaviour has in the past mainly been related to 
                                                 
36
 Verba and Nie 1972.  
37
 McAdam 1986, 70; Schussman and Soule 2005, 1085.  
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younger people; lack of obligations linked to family and occupation could point to 
young age cohorts (below 30) to be more involved. Engaging in protests such as 
demonstrations involves a degree of physical activity that may make it less likely 
that older cohorts, above 50 or 60, are taking part. Education has been found to be 
strongly associated with both conventional and unconventional political 
EHKDYLRXU,QWKHFRQWH[WRISURWHVWDVVRFLDWHGZLWKµQHZSROLWLFV¶HGXFDWLRQFDQ
EHOLQNHGWRWKHFRQFHSWRIµFRJQLWLYHPRELOL]DWLRQ¶,QJOHKDUWFRQFHLYHGRf this 
FRQFHSWDVWKHEDVLVRIDµQHZHUHOLWH-FKDOOHQJLQJPRGHRISDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶LQ
contrast to old types that relied on political parties and trade unions.
38
  
 
+RZHYHUWKHUHDUHTXHVWLRQVDERXWWKHOLQNVEHWZHHQµELRJUDSKLFDODYDLODELOLW\¶
at different stages of mobilization and for different kinds of protest. One of the 
few studies comparing protest potential and actual protest found biographical 
availability to be an important predictor of potential but not actual protest.
39
 A 
study of participation in a movement of homeless people, a protest strongly 
associated with issues of economic deprivation, showed that those with less 
biographical availability were more likely to participate.
40
 This may suggest that 
these variables are less likely to apply to protest that is mainly defined as a 
µPRYHPHQWRIFULVLV¶LQZKLFKHFRQRPLFVXUYLYDOLVDWVWDNH 
 
                                                 
38
 Inglehart 1997, 169.  
39
 Beyerlein and Hipp 2006. 
40
 Corrigall-Brown et al 2009. 
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In the 1990s, the SES approach was supplemented to create an extended model 
NQRZQDVµFLYLFYROXQWDULVP¶41 which included other resource aspects, such as 
time but also a social link: people participated in politics if they had the resources 
but also the opportunity to take part. Those integrated into social networks which 
generated requests to take part in particular actions could be seen as having more 
opportunities and were thus more likely to participate. Involvement of individuals 
in social networks has also been shown to be particularly important in turning 
µSRWHQWLDO¶LQWRµDFWXDO¶SDUWLFLSDQWV42 In line with the literature,43 we would 
expect participation in social networks, such as political parties, trade unions and 
voluntary organizations to be linked to protest behaviour. In addition to union 
membership, full-time employment, especially in the public sector, would be 
particularly likely to increase the likelihood of strike participation, as they would 
expose individuals to greater mobilization attempts.
 
In general, and contrary to 
expectations based on considerations of time availability, past surveys have 
shown that those in full-time employment are generally more likely to be involved 
in protest.
44
   
 
$QDGGLWLRQDOLPSRUWDQWYDULDEOHWKDWFDQEHWHUPHGDµUHVRXUFH¶LVSUHYLRXV
involvement in strikes and demonstrations. People socialized into a specific form 
                                                 
41
 Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995. 
42
 McAdam 1986; Klandermans and Oegema 1987. 
43
 Quintelier 2008; Somma 2010. 
44
 Verhulst and Walgrave 2009, 460.  
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of collective action could be expected to be more likely to engage in such 
behaviour in the future, although the probability of remobilization is likely to be 
DIIHFWHGE\ERWKµELRJUDSKLFDODYDLODELOLW\¶45 DQGµVRFLDOQHWZRUN¶LQYROYHPHQW
Previous protesters who were mobilized through informal recruitment networks, 
such as friends and family links, may more easily resort into renewed protest 
activity.
46
 In the absence of panel data stretching back to specific previous 
experiences of protest, however, we have to be careful about the exact nature and 
direction of causal links. The experience of protest involvement may promote a 
process of politicization that would see protesters more likely to be involved in 
trade unions, voluntary organizations, and political parties, thus providing a 
network connection. Protest involvement could also be thought to be conducive to 
adopting a left-wing ideology and attachment to left-wing politics. Finally, those 
with protest experience may have a different perception of the costs and benefits 
of protest. In order to test the independent effects of such variables, we thus also 
have to include predictors of ideological position, as well as rational choice 
criteria.  
                                                 
45
 For a detailed assessment of influence of protest participation on subsequent 
political behaviour in the US context, cf. Corrigall-Brown 2012.  
46
 The direct examination of such informal recruitment networks is beyond the scope 
of our paper. Anti-austerity protests in 2010 involved a large number of individual 
protest events, and thus it was considered impractical to ask questions relating to 
VSHFLILFLQFLGHQWVRISURWHVWSDUWLFLSDWLRQVXFKDVµWDUJHWLQJ¶HIIRUWVE\IDPLO\IULHQGV
or trade unions, which might apply to some events but not others. 
22 
This is the peer-reviewed, accepted author manuscript of the following article: Rüdig, W & Karyotis, G 2014, 'Who protests in Greece? Mass 
opposition to austerity' British Journal of Political Science, vol 44, no. 3, pp. 487-513., http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123413000112  
 
In terms of political ideology and party politics, Greece has a bi-polar system 
dominated by the left-right divide. We could expect that left-wing ideology could 
be an important predictor of protest participation. The parties of the Far Left, such 
as KKE, Syriza and DIMAR, have been particularly active in the anti-austerity 
movement, dominating much of its public relations and trying to promote a left-
wing, anti-capitalist discourse of austerity politics. A second variable could 
measure the past attachment to such parties, such as voting for Far Left parties at 
the 2009 general elections. If the anti-austerity protest essentially should turn out 
primarily as a movement of the radical left, then past support for left-wing parties 
should be an important predictor of protest participation.  
 
A key question is to what extent the anti-DXVWHULW\PRYHPHQWUHIOHFWVµQHZ¶RU
µROG¶SROLWLFVHOHPHQWVThe LPSRUWDQFHRIµSRVW-PDWHULDOYDOXHFKDQJH¶IRU
participation in a wide variety of protests has been well documented, even when 
demands are focusing on material concerns. For instance, movements such as the 
Spanish indignados mainly involve young and highly-educated people not 
FRQQHFWHGZLWKµROG¶SROLWLFVPRELOL]DWLRQFRQWH[WV like trade unions and political 
parties,
47
 who challenge the entire basis of establishment politics and promote 
demands for more participation and democratization.
48
 In addition to other 
                                                 
47
 Cf. Anduiza, Cristancho and Sabucedo 2012.  
48
 Rosenmann 2012. 
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variables, we thus also need to test whether holding post-materialist values is an 
independent predictor of protest involvement.  
 
Finally, a further theory which we should consider is rational choice, arguably the 
dominant approach in the analysis of political behaviour. A rational choice 
approach would predict that only people who perceive the benefits of taking part 
in protest to be greater than the costs are likely to take part. While some rational 
choice models of protest focus centrally on the measurement of general notions of 
political efficacy,
49
 we introduced measurements of the perceived costs and 
benefits of the specific type of anti-austerity protest that respondents might 
consider being involved in. The probability of success is measured by two items 
on the likely effectiveness of taking part in strikes and joining demonstrations. 
The cost element is measured with a question about the risk of being injured or 
arrested when taking part in a demonstration. Even with such a basic design, the 
main problem with the application of a rational choice approach in our case is the 
limitation of our data to one time point. This means that there has to be a question 
mark about the direction of causal sequences. Still, the inclusion of rational choice 
                                                 
49
 We initially followed the example of Sanders et al. 2004, focusing centrally on 
PHDVXUHPHQWV RI µSROLWLFDO HIILFDF\¶ +RZHYHU WKHVH YDULDEOHV ZHUH QRW DVVRFLDWHG
with actual protest participation in Greece at all. For this reason, we did not include 
them in our model. Also Converse and Pierce 1989 reported in their study of 1968 
protest that a general sense of political efficacy was not a predictor of protest. 
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variables remains important as controls for the assessment of the impact of 
relative deprivation and other predictors of protest. 
 
We thus have established four general areas from which relevant hypotheses 
about protest behaviour can be drawn and tested: relative deprivation, resources 
(biographical availability and social networks), political ideology, and rational 
choice. Before we discuss our findings, we need to describe our data collection 
and look more closely at some key methodological challenges.  
 
 
Data and Methodology 
Unusually in the study of involvement in a specific protest movement, the 
analysis presented here is based on a survey of the general population. This is an 
approach which has been fairly rarely used in the literature, mainly because the 
share of the population involved in individual protest events is usually too small 
to generate enough cases. In the case of anti-austerity protest in Greece, this is 
different. In addition to seven general strikes during 2010, numerous protest 
marches were also organised. According to police figures, a total of 7,123 
demonstrations took place in Greece during 2010, the vast majority of which we 
can assume was concerned with anti-austerity protest (see Table 2). Given an 
average figure of just over 200 protest events per year in the early 1990s, which 
were seen as a time of high protest incidence, this information about more than 
25 
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seven thousand events in just one year, with hundreds of marches every month, 
reveals a staggering degree of political mobilization.  
 
--- Table 2 about here --- 
 
There are few precedents for this kind of approach. As far as we are aware, the 
only previous attempt to use a general survey representative of the entire 
population at national level to analyse involvement in a specific set of political 
demonstrations was carried out by Philip Converse and Roy Pierce in France in 
the late 1960s.
50
 They conducted a general public attitude survey in the summer of 
1968, i.e. after the protest events of May 1968, finding that about 20 per cent of 
their sample was involved in strikes, and 8 per cent had taken part in 
demonstrations. Beyond this, two more studies used surveys to measure actual 
participation in widespread protest action in the East German town of Leipzig
51
 
                                                 
50
 Converse and Pierce 1986. 
51
 Mass demonstrations took place in the autumn of 1989 that played a crucial role in 
bringing down the Communist regime. Karl-Dieter Opp and his collaborators carried 
RXWDVXUYH\RIDVDPSOHRIWKHWRZQ¶VSRSXODWLRQRQH\HDUODWHULQ990, finding that 
39 per cent claimed to have demonstrated. See Opp and Gern 1993; Opp, Voss and 
Gern 1996. 
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and among the Latino population of the United States
52
 but these targeted a 
specific section of the population only defined on geographical and ethnic 
grounds. Obviously, the Greek context is radically different from the politics of 
¶LQ)UDQFHWKH&RPPXQLVWUHgime in East Germany in 1989 and US 
immigration politics in 2006. In all these cases, however, the very widespread 
nature of protest action allows an analysis of who was and who was not involved 
in a specific range of actions and thus some aspects of the previous studies were 
useful in designing our study of protest in 2010.  
 
The approach chosen has several advantages over more common ways of 
analysing protest participation. Previous empirical research on protest behaviour 
could be grouped into three main categories. The first approach is the analysis of 
SURWHVWµSRWHQWLDO¶3LRQHHUHGLQWKHVVWXGLHVVRXJKWWRDQDO\VHSURWHVWRQWKH
EDVLVRIUHVSRQGHQWV¶H[SUHVVHGOLNHOLKRRGRIHQJDJLQJLQSURWHVWDFWLYLW\DWVRPH
time in the future.
53
 While such an approach has had a wide resonance, in 
SDUWLFXODULQWKHVWXG\RIWKHµQHZVRFLDOPRYHPHQWV¶DQGUHODWHGSURWHVWHYHQWV
with continued popularity in other general attitude surveys,
54
 its main weakness 
                                                 
52
 Between 3.5 and 5.1 million Latinos mobilized in protest marches against changes 
to the status of immigrants in the spring of 2006, with 10 per cent of those surveyed 
indicating that they had taken part in the demonstrations. See Barreto et al. 2009. 
53
 Barnes and Kaase et al. 1979. 
54
 Sanders et al. 2004; Heath 2008; Jenkins, Wallace and Fullerton 2008.  
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ZDVDOZD\VLWVIRFXVRQµSRWHQWLDO¶RUµSUREDEOH¶SURWHVWbehaviour.55 It thus 
remains uncertain to what extent inferences about actual protest behaviour can be 
drawn on the basis of survey questions about what type of behaviour an individual 
might or might not engage in at some unspecified time in the future on an 
unspecified issue of political controversy. Our data, on the other hand, will allow 
XVQRWRQO\WRDQDO\VHWKHGHWHUPLQDQWVRIµSRWHQWLDO¶SURWHVWEXWDOVRWRVFUXWLQL]H
WKHIDFWRUVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWXUQLQJµSRWHQWLDO¶LQWRµDFWXDO¶SURWHVW 
 
A second group of studies concentrates on the analysis of past protest behaviour. 
Major surveys such as the World Values Survey, the International Social Survey 
Programme, the European Values Study, and the European Social Survey have 
included questions about past protest behaviour, such as attending 
demonstrations, either without any time restrictions or with reference to the 
previous 12 months. A number of analyses have been published on the basis of 
such large international datasets.
56
 One weakness of this approach is the lack of 
specificity. Respondents are asked about participation in particular types of 
SROLWLFDOEHKDYLRXUVXFKDVµDWWHQGLQJDODZIXOGHPRQVWUDWLRQ¶ZLWKRXWDQ\
reference to the type of issue or movement that this activity was related to. Thus, 
a broad range of phenomena, including left-wing, environmental, anti-tax, law 
and order and other right-wing protest issues are mingled together. In our analysis 
                                                 
55
 Rootes 1981. For strike action see Buttigieg, Deery and Iverson 2008. 
56
 Cf. for example Schussman and Soule 2005; Dalton, Sickle and Weldon 2009; 
Marien, Hooghe and Quintelier 2010.  
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of a specific protest movement, we can also examine what accounts for past 
protest involvement and assess the role of such an experience for participation in 
a contemporary movement.  
 
A third group seeks to sidestep the limitations of general attitude surveys by 
surveying those engaged in protest directly, an approach that has become the 
dominant method of sociologists of social movements to analyse movement 
participation. After some pioneering empirical work in Belgium,
57
 major 
comparative research projects involving surveys of demonstrators were conducted 
in the 2000s.
58
 Such studies allow for excellent assessments of the background of 
demonstrators engaged in specific actions and on different types of movements 
but are restrained by their inevitable lack of data on non-demonstrators.
59
 This 
makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to analyse the recruitment process and 
answer the question of what determines whether an individual protests or not. 
 
In order to take advantage of the unique opportunity to study protest behaviour 
presented by the events in Greece, a telephone survey was conducted by Kappa 
                                                 
57
 Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001; Norris, Walgrave and Van Aelst 2005. 
58
 Walgrave and Rucht 2010; for later surveys of demonstrators, see Klandermans 
2012 and other papers published in that journal issue as well as the website: 
http://www.protestsurvey.eu, accessed 28 February 2012. 
59
 There are very few studies comparing actual strikers and non-strikers, see Snarr 
1975;  McClendon and Klaas 1993; Dixon and Roscigno 2003. 
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Research, Athens, in early December 2010. The selection method used was a 
stratified quota sample. Quotas were defined according to census data for gender 
and age. Telephone codes were first selected corresponding to each region in 
relation to its population size. The remaining dialling digits were generated 
randomly by computer software. The suitability of each respondent was first 
queried in terms of minimum age (18) and voting rights (Greek citizen) before 
proceeding with each interview. Only one interview could be conducted per 
household. This process generated a dataset with 1014 valid responses that is 
representative of the distribution of the Greek population in terms of geographical 
location, gender and age.  
 
How do we analyse the determinants of anti-austerity protests and test our 
hypotheses? The design of our study is primarily inspired by the pioneering work 
of Bert Klandermans and Dirk Oegema,
60
 who distinguished a number of steps in 
the analysis of protest involvement. In adapting this model to our data, we 
identify four steps that can help us dissect the individual drivers for protest, while 
also allowing for the influence of contextual factors to shine through: (i) 
Motivation potential: agreement with/sympathy for the goals of the protest; (ii) 
Protest potential: attitudes towards protest action; (iii) Protest opportunities: 
perceived access to protest, and (iv) Actual participation. 
 
                                                 
60
 This model is adapted from Klandermans and Oegema 1987, 524; cf. also van 
Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2010, 190.  
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The first step is to concentrate on the explanation of opposition to the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VDXVWHULW\SROLF\:LWKRXt controlling for the degree of opposition, it 
will be impossible to identify the factors that explain actual protest behaviour 
UDWKHUWKDQWKHVWUHQJWKRIDWWLWXGHVRQDXVWHULW\:HDVNHGUHVSRQGHQWVµ7RZKDW
extent do you support or oppose the governmenW¶VDXVWHULW\SURJUDPPH"¶SHU
cent expressed opposition to the programme. The second step in our model 
concerns attitudes to protest. Some respondents may be opposed to the austerity 
programme but may not support the idea that people should protest against it. 
5HVSRQGHQWVZHUHDVNHGWRUHDFWWRWKHVWDWHPHQWµ3HRSOHVKRXOGSURWHVWDJDLQVW
WKHDXVWHULW\PHDVXUHV¶SHUFHQWVWURQJO\DJUHHGDQGSHUFHQWDJUHHG$
clear majority of the population was thus in favour of protest. Of those opposed to 
goverQPHQW¶VSROLF\RIDXVWHULW\PRUHWKDQSHUFHQWVXSSRUWHGSURWHVW 
 
The third step is to look at other obstacles that may prevent opponents of austerity 
willing to protest from joining an actual protest. As a wide variety of protests and 
strikes were organized during 2010, one might assume that everybody could have 
found some kind of protest to join. While this might be true in the larger cities, in 
particular Athens where more than half of all demonstrations, 4268, took place in 
2010, it could not necessarily be assumed to apply in the rural and island 
communities. Protest behaviour is collective behaviour, i.e. individuals are joining 
a strand of behaviour that involves many others. The vast majority of people 
participating in protests are not involved in the organization of protest. That poses 
a problem in that non-participation may simply be a reflection of no protest 
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having been organized in the community in which the respondent lives. On the 
other hand, many people travelled specially to attend protest events outside their 
communities.  
 
We asked respondents whether they were aware of any protest activities in their 
local community before going on to inquire about their own protest participation. 
This essentially follows the approach by Converse and Pierce in France. Such a 
construction also allows us to use this variable as a measurement of the 
opportunity to protest. One third of respondents reported that no strikes had been 
taken place in their community and slightly more than one third, 37 per cent, 
reported that no demonstrations had been organized. About 57 per cent of 
respondents lived in towns or communities in which both strikes and 
demonstrations took place and 26 per cent of respondents reported neither taking 
place. Given the widespread nature of strikes and demonstrations in 2010, this is 
rather higher than we expected. A closer look at the localities of respondents 
reveals that there is a major gap between the major cities, smaller towns and 
country villages. About 80 per cent of respondents residing in big cities reported 
strikes and demonstrations. This drops to between 47 and 55 per cent in the 
suburbs and small towns, and to 38 per cent in country villages. There is thus 
evidence that protest opportunities were much smaller in rural areas. This echoes 
&RQYHUVHDQG3LHUFH¶VILQGLQJWKDWSURWHVWLQKDGDOVRSUHGRPLQDQWO\EHHQ
an urban phenomenon.
61
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In order to develop an overall model of protest involvement that assesses the 
effect of various individual-level variables, we also have to consider past protest 
involvement. As suggested in our earlier discussion of the socio-political and 
historical context, this may be indicative of the influence of a particular protest 
culture, or it may simply mean that participation barriers are reduced through the 
previous protest experience.
62
 Asked about previous participation in strikes and 
demonstrations, 8 out 10 anti-austerity protesters in 2010 had taken part in either 
demonstrations or strikes, or both, before. We thus have a closer look at the 
factors explaining both past and present protest, and compare models with and 
without the previous protest involvement variable, in order to assess the relative 
effect of various possible predictors of protest. 
 
About one fifth of all respondents, 21 per cent, reported that they had taken part in 
strike action. 19 per cent said that they had taken part in demonstration in their 
local community. In addition, we also asked whether respondents had taken part 
LQGHPRQVWUDWLRQVµRXWVLGH¶WKHLURZQWRZQRUFRPPXnity; 8 per cent of 
respondents said they had  done so. With some taking part in more than one form 
or protest, the total share of people taking part in at least one form of protest was 
slightly less than one third, 29 per cent. Our main dependent variable is thus 
protest participation, including all forms of such protest. As we do expect some 
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differences between participation in strikes and demonstrations, both forms of 
protest are also analysed separately. 
 
We begin by discussing opposition to the governmHQW¶VDXVWHULW\SURJUDPPH
support for protest against the programme, and the perception of opportunities to 
join the protest.  Analytically, we are particularly interested in the analysis of 
µSRWHQWLDOSURWHVW¶WKDWFRXOGEHWKHVXEMHFWRImobilization efforts defined by 
opposition to the austerity programme combined with the belief that people 
should protest against it. The primary purpose of this is, however, to define 
control variables for the analysis of actual protest participation. Accounting for 
opposition to austerity, support for protest and the opportunity for protest, which 
factors predict people actually turning out to take part in strikes and 
demonstrations?  
 
To develop an overall model of protest involvement which assesses the effect of 
various individual-level variables, one factor that we should include and are 
particularly interested in ± following our discussion of Greek protest culture ± is 
previous protest involvement. We thus have a closer look at the factors explaining 
both past and present protest activity, and compare models with and without the 
previous protest involvement variable in order to assess the relative effect of 
various possible predictors of protest. 
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Findings 
The results of the first step in our analysis, seeking to explain opposition to 
austerity, support for protest, and perception of protest opportunities are presented 
in Table 3. The strength of opposition to the austerity programme is associated 
with relative deprivation variables. Previous protest participation and other 
aspects of biographical availability play no role. Opposition is particularly strong, 
as could be expected, among supporters of far-left parties (KKE, Syriza). Also the 
perception of the effectiveness plays a role.  
 
--- Table 3 about here --- 
 
Controlling for opposition to the austerity programme, what determines support 
for protest against the policy? Again, relative deprivation variables are associated 
with protest potential. Apart from supporters of far-left parties and rational choice 
variables, some aspects of biographical availability and political resources also 
play a part. Potential protesters are younger, less likely to have been to university, 
and less likely to be members of political parties. Interestingly, previous protest 
involvement plays no role for the generation of protest potential.  
 
With regards to perception of protest opportunity, place of residence is the most 
important predictor. Respondents in big cities are considerably more likely to 
perceive an opportunity to protest in comparison with rural residents. Previous 
protest involvement also makes it more likely that respondents perceive protest 
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opportunities, as is a perception that demonstrations are an effective form of 
political action. Otherwise, neither relative deprivation, biographical availability 
nor ideology play a role.  
 
Turning to the main question of who protested against austerity in 2010, one 
aspect that is clearly of central importance is the role of previous protest 
involvement.  More than 4 out of 5 protesters had participated in protest in the 
previous ten years. The first part of our analysis of actual protest behaviour is thus 
a comparison of the determinants of 2010 protest involvement in comparison with 
protest in previous years. Relative deprivation variables, for which we do not have 
historical data, and control variables that are only relevant to the austerity 
movement are omitted from this analysis (see Table 4).  
 
--- Table 4 about here --- 
 
The analysis of previous protest involvement (column 1) confirms most of the 
classical hypotheses about protest involvement: protesters are found to be 
younger, male, highly educated, working in the public sector, members of trade 
unions and/or voluntary associations, with a left-wing ideology as well as post-
materialist values, and with high perceptions of the effectiveness of protest and 
low perception of cost. Remarkably, the analysis of 2010 protest (column 2) fits 
the same model rather well, with only a few exceptions: 2010 protesters are not as 
predominantly male, are married or living with a partner, and are in full-time 
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employment. These results strongly suggest that protest in 2010 is essentially a 
continuation of previous protest trends rather than a radical break from the 
FRXQWU\¶VKLVWRU\RIFRQWHQWLRXVSRlitics.   
 
How do these predictors of protest participation stand up if we control for the 
specific features of anti-austerity protest, namely opposition to austerity policies, 
support for protest against these policies and the perceived opportunities to join a 
protest?  To what extent does the predictive power of relative deprivation also 
makes a contribution to the explanation of how potential is turned into actual 
protest? The results of the analysis shown in column 3 (Model 2) demonstrate 
quite clearly that relative deprivation is not a factor when it comes to mobilizing 
people to take part in actual protest. Otherwise, the co-efficients of Model 2 are 
remarkably similar to those in Model 1 not including the control variables. While 
the effect of trade union membership does not pass the test of statistical 
significance in this model, a separate analysis of strike participation (details not 
shown) suggests this variable together with full-time employment to be important 
predictors in the public sector. Looking at the relative importance of different 
types of predictors (details not shown), network involvement and political 
ideology have the highest impact on protest participation, followed by rational 
choice. The effect of biographical availability is very small by comparison.
63
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 7KLV DVVHVVPHQW LV EDVHG RQ WKH FRPSDULVRQ RI $,& $NDLNH¶V ,QIRUPDWLRQ
Criterion) and BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion) statistics for various models in 
which the relative quality of models including relative deprivation, biographical 
37 
This is the peer-reviewed, accepted author manuscript of the following article: Rüdig, W & Karyotis, G 2014, 'Who protests in Greece? Mass 
opposition to austerity' British Journal of Political Science, vol 44, no. 3, pp. 487-513., http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123413000112  
Overall, this model of 2010 protest participation confirms the earlier analysis that 
the significant individual-level predictors of anti-austerity protest, with some 
more minor exceptions, fit the pattern of variables responsible for previous 
protests. 
 
Moving on to our final analysis (column 4) which adds previous protest 
experience to our model, we seek to answer two additional questions. First, how 
important is previous protest participation once we control for opposition to 
austerity policy, protest potential and protest opportunity, as well as all other 
individual-level predictors of protest, ranging from relative deprivation to 
resources and biographical availability, political ideology and rational choice?  
Second, once we control for previous protest participation, which of our variables 
explains the new mobilization process?  
 
Dealing with the second question first, we have already seen in the analysis in 
column 1 that biographical availability, network involvement, political ideology 
and rational choice variables are all independent predictors of previous protest 
involvement. This analysis confirms most of the standard theories of protest 
mobilization. But do the same factors also play a role in mobilizing new protests? 
Here the results throw up a few unexpected findings.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
availability, network involvement, political ideology and rational choice variables, is 
compared. 
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Age does not quite have the anticipated effect. Younger people are slightly more 
likely to engage in protest but once previous protest is controlled for, the co-
efficient is not statistically significant any more. This contradicts not only our 
theoretical expectations but also many of the journalistic accounts that often focus 
centrally on the role of youth culture and the internet as key elements of a new 
generation of protest.
64
 Our results challenge these accounts. The Greek protesters 
of 2010 are not particularly young; their average age is only marginally lower 
than the national average; the age group with the highest share of both strikers and 
demonstrators consists of those between 45 and 54 years; 48 per cent of this age 
group went on strike and 43 per cent attended a local demonstration. Even among 
those over 65, involvement in protest is still strong, with 20 per cent attending 
demonstrations; the oldest demonstrator in the sample is 88 years old. Therefore, 
unlike the social unrest of December 2008,
65
 mass protest against the austerity 
measures in 2010 is not the preserve of the young but involves people of all ages, 
particularly the middle-aged. 
 
Similarly, gender is not as important as could be expected for new mobilizations 
and those who are married are slightly more likely to engage in strikes and 
demonstrations, while having children discourages people from taking part in 
protest. As far as employment status is concerned, those in full-time employment 
are more likely to be mobilized in 2010. Otherwise, education, membership of 
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39 
This is the peer-reviewed, accepted author manuscript of the following article: Rüdig, W & Karyotis, G 2014, 'Who protests in Greece? Mass 
opposition to austerity' British Journal of Political Science, vol 44, no. 3, pp. 487-513., http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123413000112  
trade unions and voluntary associations, and political ideology are not 
significantly associated with the mobilization of anti-austerity protest, once we 
control for past protest involvement. These results thus show that while factors 
such as age (youth), gender  (male), education, public sector employment, 
membership of trade unions and voluntary organisation, left-wing ideology and 
post-materialism have an indirect effect on 2010 protest behaviour through past 
protest experience, they do not have a direct effect, once past protest involvement 
is controlled for.  
 
The analysis presented in this model combines a number of different processes 
and types of protest.  What factors deteUPLQHZKHWKHUµYHWHUDQ¶SURWHVWHUVDUHUH-
mobilized in 2010 or not? What accounts for the recruitment of novice protesters?  
Are the effects different for strikes and demonstrations? We conducted analyses 
of all these separate mobilization processes; the main differences we found are 
between strikers and demonstrators, and separate models are presented for each 
form of protest in columns 5 and 6.  
 
Age is not a relevant variable in these more detailed analyses. However, gender 
features surprisingly strongly for participation in strikes, and a comparison of new 
and veteran strikers (details not shown) suggests that women are particularly 
noticeable among new recruits in strike action. Being married or living with a 
partner is positively associated with both striking and demonstrating. This 
variable is very strongly associated with the mobilization of veteran protesters 
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(details not shown).  Having children is negatively associated in protest 
participation, in particular for strike action. Being in full-time employment is a 
strong predictor of mobilization for strikes (for both new and veteran strikers).  
Finally, neither trade union membership nor left-wing ideology plays a role for 
either strikers or demonstrators, with the sole exception of trade union 
membership as a statistically significant predictor of new strike recruits.  
 
What are we to make of these results?  Some of these detailed findings may be the 
product of the specific mobilization context experienced in 2010. The violence 
associated with protest in 2008 as well as 2010 may have made parents more 
conscious of the risks involved; the extreme nature of the austerity measures 
could have motivated people not previously associated with protest to become 
active. Overall, the main thrust of these results appears to support the notion that 
people faced with extreme economic hardship may become mobilized, contrary to 
expectations on the impact of biographical availability factors.
66
 
 
This leaves us now with what clearly is the most important group of predictors, 
namely previous protest involvement. With 80 per cent of protesters having taken 
part at least once in either strikes or demonstrations before, this is perhaps not 
surprising. Looking at the role of the frequency of previous protest involvement 
provides an additional perspective. In Model 3 (Table 4, column 4), we find that 
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the more often respondents had taken part in demonstrations before, the more 
likely they were to become involved in anti-austerity protest in 2010.   
 
The strength of the predictive power of previous protest involvement is 
underlined even further, once we combine the frequency of taking part in 
demonstrations and strikes. This analysis (details not shown) suggests that those 
who have been involved in both strikes and demonstrations multiple times before 
are the most likely to take part in anti-austerity protest. Those who have either 
taken part in both strikes and demonstrations more than 5 times over the last ten 
years, or who have taken part more than 5 times in one and at least 2-5 times in 
the other, are considerably more likely to take part in protest in 2010. Keeping all 
other variables constant (at their mean), the predicted probability of protest 
participation was calculated in relation to previous protest experience, combining 
the frequency of participation in strikes and demonstrations on a scale of 0 to 6. 
The result displayed in Figure 3 shows emphatically that protest participation in 
2010 is to a large extent a function of the degree of previous protest involvement.  
 
--- Figure 3 about here --- 
 
 
Discussion 
What does our analysis of the Greek case tells us about drivers of political protest 
in general and the anti-austerity movement in particular? A key finding is that 
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different variables matter at different stages of the process: the drivers change as 
our focus shifts from explaining opposition to austerity, to protest potential and, 
ultimately, actual protest participation.  
 
Starting with the influence of economic deprivation and feelings of injustice, our 
results show that these contribute to protest behaviour in Greece as significant 
predictors of opposition to austerity policies and support for protest. However, 
relative deprivation is not a predictor of turning potential into actual participation. 
The second group of variables associated with resources (biographical availability 
and network involvement) performs somewhat better in explaining actual protest. 
In line with the main tenets of civic voluntarism, people protest if they have the 
resources and the opportunity to protest. However, against expectations, some key 
variables, not least education, do not play the expected role in the Greek case. 
Yet, this, in combination with other factors, characterizes the type of protest quite 
well. This is not a protest movement of a middle-class educational elite, being 
DFWLYHLQWKHLUVSDUHWLPHDVPRVWµQHZVRFLDOPRYHPHQWV¶LQ:HVWHUQ(XURSH
have been in recent decades. This is a mass protest in which ordinary people of all 
educational backgrounds and ages take part. It is also those in full-time 
employment who are most likely to be involved, in both strikes and 
demonstrations, and this variable remains an independent predictor with previous 
protest being controlled for. In other words, those involved most closely in 
economic life, rather than others on the margins or outside of the labour force, are 
the main carriers of this protest movement. 
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In terms of the recruitment of protesters, it is the traditional network of trade 
union and voluntary group membership, as well as public sector employment that 
play a key role. However, these exert their influence through past protest 
experience; none of these network factors are independent predictors of protest, 
once past protest is controlled for. The same applies to political ideology 
variables, left-wing ideology and post-materialism, which are both significant 
predictors of past and present protest but are not independent predictors of anti-
austerity protest, once past protest experience is taken into account.  
 
The dominance of the role of past protest engagement should caution us to 
interpret this result in terms of the marginality of the involvement in social 
networks as a predictor of protest participation. What is beyond doubt is that anti-
austerity protest involves to a large extent the mobilization of an existing pool of 
experienced strikers and demonstrators. The share of those without any previous 
participation is fairly small. There are hints that there are some new aspects in 
2010, for example the role of women among strikers, but the drivers of first-time 
mobilization is a separate question altogether, which requires further 
elaboration.
67
 
 
Finally, one of the most intriguing findings is that the rational choice variables are 
found to play a role at all stages of the protest recruitment process. A high 
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evaluation of the effectiveness of protest, in particular demonstrations, is an 
independent predictor of opposition to austerity, protest potential and perception 
of protest opportunity. Moreover, rational choice variables are also independent 
predictors of not only past but also actual protest in 2010, even when controlling 
for protest potential and the degree of past protest experience. Despite the 
inherent limitations of interpreting these results with a one-time survey, their 
robustness across the board suggests that rational choice considerations should be 
taken seriously in any model of protest behaviour.  
 
Conclusion 
Anti-austerity protest in Greece constitutes a mass movement, with our survey 
reporting that about 30 per cent of the entire population engaged in some type of 
protest in 2010. The analysis of the profile of protesters demonstrates that protest 
is not the preserve of those with a high socio-economic status, high levels of 
education or lots of time on their hands. Equally, it is not primarily students, 
political extremists or dropouts that were involved in the actions. Protesters 
mainly came from the political left but otherwise, it was the average Greek who 
took part, those in full-time employment, married, not particularly young or old, 
or highly educated. In other words, the protests came from the heart of society and 
ODFNHGWKHµQHZVRFLDOPRYHPHQW¶FKDUDFWHULVWLFVHPSKDVL]HGE\WKHOLWHUDWXUHRQ
protest of recent decades. +RZDUG.HUER¶VGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQµPovements of 
DIIOXHQFH¶DQGµPRYHPHQWVRIFULVLV¶RIIHUVDXVHIXOZD\WRFDSWXUHWKHVH
differences ± anti-austerity protest clearly falls in the latter category. 
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3URWHVWDJDLQVWDXVWHULW\DOVRKDVDIHHOLQJRIµROG¶SROLWLFVDERXWLWWKDWPD\EH
reminiscent of the strike movements of previous decades. With four out of five 
participants having taken part in protest before, it is evident that many of the usual 
suspects were re-mobilized, i.e. people in employment, who are trade union 
members and have left-wing political views. Still, protest in Greece is historically 
not limited to followers of Far Left parties. Once the influence of previous protest 
participation was accounted for, ideology does not play that much of a role, 
indicating that the high degree of mobilization of veteran and new protesters in 
2010 was not limited to left-wing activists alone.  
A more plausible explanation is that the usual suspects in Greece, through their 
organizational infrastructure, act as first-movers in the generation of protest 
opportunities, which trigger the latent protest socialization of a broader public that 
is not strongly defined ideologically in left-right terms. This may also have some 
implications for the phenomenal rise in the vote for parties of the left, particularly 
Syriza, in the double elections of 2012. Their electoral success may partly be 
attributed to their ability to attract opponents of the austerity policy who are not 
necessarily radicalized in terms of ideology. If this holds true, the future electoral 
behaviour of these voters is likely to be in flux and largely defined by how the 
debt crisis develops and how it is managed by the governing coalition. 
Nevertheless, the medium to long-term political impact of the anti-austerity 
movement remains completely open and cannot be established with a one-time 
survey alone or without panel data. 
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From the above, there are two main theoretical and comparative implications for 
austerity politics, which are of broader relevance beyond the Greek case. First, the 
factors that predict protest potential are not a good measure of who actually takes 
part in protest. High levels of deprivation are able to bring large sections of the 
population to embrace the idea of protest against government policy. However, 
while deprivation increases the potential for austerity protest, it is not an 
independent predictor of actual protest. The probability of significant anti-
austerity protest movements will thus depend on other contextual factors. 
 
Second, the most significant implication for other countries is that previous 
protest participation on its own constitutes an important recruiting pool for actual 
protest. People are recruited into strikes and demonstrations through a process of 
having been socialized into taking particular forms of political action. In light of 
this, we should expect that the potential for protest in the wake of austerity 
measure will depend notably on the extent to which people have been engaged in 
prior protest. In countries where there is a strong, established protest culture, 
where a significant minority regularly engages in such activities, it should be 
easier for protest potential to be transformed into actual protect participation. This 
would suggest that anti-austerity movements might struggle to reach high levels 
of mobilization in countries such as Ireland, the UK, and Portugal, but are likely 
to have a broader appeal in Italy and Spain.  
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We obviously have to be careful in formulating conclusions about cross-national 
differences in protest behaviour on the basis of the analysis of individual-level 
data. The combination of taking into account both the drivers of mobilization at 
the individual level and the aggregate context at the national level offers the most 
promising avenue for developing our understanding of protest behaviour. The 
analysis in this paper clearly demonstrates the central role of the Greek protest 
culture and its dynamic interrelationship with individual drivers to produce anti-
austerity protest. Future cross-national comparative research is necessary to take 
account of other contextual variables, such as the relative power of parliament,
68
 
in the explanation of the emergence and development of anti-austerity 
movements. 
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)LJXUH3DUWLFLSDWLRQLQµODZIXO¶GHPRQVWUDWLRQVLQWKHODVWPRQWKV-2011 (in per cent) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: European Social Survey, Waves 1-5, 2002-2011, http://ess.nsd.uib.no [accessed 2 April 
2012]; own analysis restricted to citizens of the country aged 18 or over, design weight applied. 
4XHVWLRQZRUGLQJµ'XULQJWhe last 12 months, have you done any of the following: - taken part 
LQDODZIXOSXEOLFGHPRQVWUDWLRQ"<HV1R¶ 
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Source: Standard Eurobarometer 70-76, 2008-2011, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch.en.htm [accessed 2 April 2012].Question 
ZRUGLQJµ+RZZRXOG\RXMXGJHWKHFXUUHQWVLWXDWLRQLQHDFKRIWKHIollowing?  - The financial 
situation of your household ± 9HU\JRRGUDWKHUJRRGUDWKHUEDGYHU\EDG¶ 
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Figure 3: Predicted Probability of Protest Participation 2010 in Relation to Previous Protest 
Participation 
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Table 1:  Number of General Strikes in South European Countries, 2002-2011 
 
        
           
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Greece 1 0 1 3 2 1 1 1 7 7 
Italy 2 2 2 1 0 0 1 1 1 2 
Portugal 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
Spain 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 
 
Sources: Hamann, Johnston and Kelly 2013; European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO); 
http://eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/index.htm >DFFHVVHG$SULO@DXWKRUV¶GDWDEDVH 
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Table 2: Number of Demonstrations in Greece in 2010  
 
 
Month Number 
 Nationwide Athens 
Jan 580 250 
Feb 551 257 
March 603 316 
Apr 544 364 
May 856 425 
June 791 513 
July 552 343 
Aug 189 150 
Sept 694 461 
Oct 739 611 
Nov 695 492 
Dec 329 86 
TOTAL 7123 4268 
 
 
Source:  Hellenic Police Statistics, Personal Communication with Press Office, 2 April 2012 
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Table 3: Determinants of Opposition to Austerity, Protest Potential and Perceived Protest 
Opportunity* 
 Opposition to 
Austerity 
Programme 
 
(1) 
Potential 
Protesters 
(People should 
protest) 
(2) 
Perceived Protest 
Opportunity 
 
(3) 
Controls    
Opposed to austerity 
programme 
- 0.500*** (0.060) -0.044 (0.066) 
People should protest ± 
agree 
- - -0.131 (0.073) 
Place of Residence 
(Reference: farm or 
village) 
- Small town, suburb 
- Big city 
- -  
 
 
0.331 (0.218) 
1.706*** (0.215) 
    
Relative Deprivation    
Personal Financial 
Situation (compared to a 
year ago) - worse 
0.399*** (0.086) 0.190*(0.078) 0.037 (0.091) 
Economic Expectations 
(next 12 months) - worse 
0.488*** (0.065) 0.218** (0.066) -0.056 (0.075) 
Blame ± each and 
everyone of use ± not at 
all responsible 
0.470* (0.225) 0.461 (0.241) -0.190 (0.241) 
Burden not fairly 
distributed - agree 
0.063 (0.072) 0.237*** (0.068) -0.012 (0.070) 
    
Biographical Availability    
Age (older) -0.002 (0.005) -0.022*** (0.005) -0.008 (0.006) 
Male 0.067 (0.133) -0.165 (0.135) 0.045 (0.150) 
Married or living with 
partner 
-0.099 (0.194) 0.129 (0.200) 0.012 (0.221) 
Children -0.141 (0.217) 0.153 (0.241) -0.179 (0.235) 
Education (university) -0.173 (0.136) -0.333* (0.139) 0.115 (0.166) 
    
Networks    
In full-time employment 0.197 (0.151) -0.286 (0.146) -0.296 (0.166) 
Public sector 0.006 (0.162) -0.126 (0.155) -0.323 (0.169) 
Member of Political Party 0.117 (0.246) -0.474* (0.232) 0.450 (0.258) 
Member of Trade Union 0.302 (0.258) 0.215 (0.228) 0.510 (0.290) 
Member of Voluntary -0.032 (0.166) -0.205 (0.167) 0.048 (0.196) 
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*Cell entries are ordered logit regression coefficients,  robust standard errors in parentheses; 
tests of statistical significance: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001; $,&$LNDLNH¶V,QIRUPDWLRQ
Criterion; BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion (both AIC and BIC are reported in the 
YHUVLRQDVµXVHGE\67$7$¶FI-6FRWW/RQJDQG-HUHP\)UHHVHRegression Models for 
Association 
Previous Participation in 
Demonstrations 
(Reference: never) 
- once 
- 2-5 times 
- More than 5 times 
 
 
 
0.379 (0.371) 
-0.301 (0.191 
0.356 (0.280) 
 
 
 
-0.313 (0.376) 
0.071 (0.216) 
0.314 (0.272) 
 
 
 
0.272 (0.433) 
0.560* (0.252) 
0.472 (0.339) 
Previous Participation in 
Strikes 
(Reference: never) 
- once 
- 2-5 times 
More than 5 times 
 
 
 
-0.095 (0.326) 
-0.108 (0.227) 
0.034 (0.248) 
 
 
 
0.327 (0.354) 
0.340 (0.244) 
0.309 (0.247) 
 
 
 
0.889* (0.432) 
0.179 (0.263) 
0.690** (0.265) 
    
Political Ideology    
Left wing (left-right scale) -0.071 (0.154) -0.081 (0.150) 0.142 (0.160) 
Voted for party left of 
PASOK in 2009 
1.061*** (0.224) 0.551* (0.235) -0.211 0.248) 
Postmaterialism 0.031  (0.070) 0.132 (0.069) -0.099 (0.074) 
    
Rational Choice    
Effectiveness of 
participating in 
demonstrations (high) 
0.162* (0.071) 0.275*** (0.075) 0.156* (0.073) 
Effectiveness of 
participating in strikes 
(high) 
0.140 (0.073) 0.144* (0.069) -0.060 (0.075) 
Cost of taking part in a 
demonstration (low) 
-0.032 (0.055) -0.013 (0.058) 0.051 (0.057) 
    
Log pseudolikelihood -1200.217 -1082.124 -762.041 
0F.HOYLH	=DYRLQD¶V 
Pseudo-r
2 
0.254 0.381 0.245 
AIC 2460.435 2226.248 1588.082 
BIC 2604.104 2374.706 1741.329 
N 888 888 888 
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Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata, 2
nd
 ed. (College Station, TX: Stata Press, 
2006), pp. 110-113 
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Table 4: Determinants of Protest Against Austerity Policy 
 Previous protest 
involvement 
 
 
(1) 
Actual Protest Participation (2010) 
Strikes and/or Demonstrations Demonstrations  
 
 
(5) 
Strikes 
 
 
(6) 
Model 1 
 
(2) 
Model 2 
 
(3) 
Model 3 
 
(4) 
Controls       
Opposition to austerity 
programme 
-  -0.012 (0.079) 0.006 (0.088) -0.236 (0.093) -0.017 (0.105) 
Protest Potential -  0.439**(0.099) 0.403***(0.107) 0.356**(0.112) 0.526***(0.137) 
Perceived Protest 
Opportunity  
- 
 
 
 
1.068***(0.138) 
 
0.979*** (0.153) 
 
0.866*** (0.171) 
 
2.048*** (0.226) 
 
       
Relative Deprivation       
Personal Financial 
Situation (compared to a 
year ago) - worse 
-  -0.016 (0.117) -0.103 (0.121) -0.078(0.139) 0.145 (0.158) 
Economic Expectations 
(next 12 months) - 
worse 
-  0.063 (0.102) 0.084 (0.110) 0.082 (0.125) 0.149 (0.133) 
Blame ± each and 
everyone of use ± not at 
all responsible 
  0.411 (0.261) 0.382 (0.272) 0.484 (0.290) 0.096 (0.304) 
Burden not fairly 
distributed - agree 
-  0.023 (0.086) 0.028 (0.087) 0.007 (0.094) -0.122 (0.104) 
       
Biographical 
Availability 
      
Age (older) -0.022*** (0.006) -0.021** (0.007) -0.016* (0.007) -0.011 (0.009) 0.001 (0.009) -0.015 (0.011) 
Male 0.483** (0.163) 0.223 (0.173) 0.251 (0.188) -0.061 (0.213) 0.281 (0.224) -0.496* (0.247) 
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Married or living with 
partner 
-0.006 (0.256) 0.644* (0.280) 0.771**(0.283) 0.803**(0.296) 0.689*(0.341) 1.003**(0.365) 
Children 0.221 (0.291) -0.445 (0.302) -0.565 (0.313) -0.834*(0.332) -0.649 (0.385) -0.878* (0.408) 
Education (university) 0.441* (0.170) 0.129 (0.184) 0.127 (0.210) 0.073(0.229) 0.038 (0.243) 0.189 (0.281) 
       
Networks       
In full-time employment 0.325 (0.175) 0.687*** (0.183) 0.884***(0.210) 0.622**(0.237) 0.052 (0.254) 1.196***(0.276) 
Public sector 0.625*** (0.179)   0.479* (0.194) 0.597** (0.211) 0.399 (0.238) 0.144 (0.260) 0.483 (0.268) 
Member of Political 
Party 
0.081 (0.286) 0.515 (0.278) 0.420 (0.299) 0.308 (0.340) 0.442 (0.358) 0.007 (0.384) 
Member of Trade Union 1.265***(0.306) 0.609* (0.299) 0.416(0.337) 0.076 (0.395) 0.426 (0.362) 0.539 (0.445) 
Member of Voluntary 
Association 
0.535* (0.208) 0.468* (0.222) 0.553* (0.239) 0.310 (0.267) 0.086 (0.289) 0.480 (0.305) 
Previous Participation in 
Demonstrations 
(Reference: No) 
- Once 
- 2-5 times 
- More than 5 
times 
-    
 
 
0.726 (0.455) 
0.942** (0.280) 
2.005*** (0.431) 
 
 
 
1.403** (0.517) 
1.446*** (0.284) 
2.261*** (0.401) 
 
 
 
0.089 (0.541) 
0.115 (0.368) 
0.881* (0.403) 
Previous Participation in 
Strikes (Reference: No) 
- Once 
- 2-5 times 
More than 5 times 
-    
 
1.476*** (0.414) 
1.472*** (0.319) 
1.174** (0.347) 
 
 
1.089* (0.456) 
.820* (0.348) 
-0.078 (0.378) 
 
 
2.161*** (0.476) 
2.011*** (0.390) 
2.146*** (0.376) 
       
Political Ideology       
Left wing (left-right 
scale) 
0.403* (0.168) 0.607** (0.179) 0.531**(0.204) 0.403 (0.236) 0.371 (0.238) 0.005 (0.283) 
Voted for party left of 
PASOK in 2009 
0.985** (0.307) 0.389 (0.303) 0.241 (0.331) -0.096(0.353) -0.102 (0.316) 0.349 (0.438) 
Postmaterialism 0.160* (0.080)   0.189* (0.086) 0.241* (0.098) 0.140 (0.110) 0.181 (0.117) 0.080 (0.134) 
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Cell entries are and binary logit regression coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses; tests of statistical significance: * p<.05, 
** p<.01, *** p<.001; $,&$LNDLNH¶V,QIRUPDWLRQ&ULWHULRQ%,&%D\HVLDQ,QIRUPDWLRQ&ULWHULRQ 
 
 
Rational Choice       
Effectiveness of 
participating in 
demonstrations (high) 
0.232** (0.076) 0.382*** (0.085) 0.275** (0.090) 0.282**(0.103) 0.302* (0.120) 0.020 (0.118) 
Effectiveness of 
participating in strikes 
(high) 
0.268*** (0.077) 0.147 (0.085) 0.104 (0.090) -0.079 (0.108) -0.001 (0.124) 0.062 (0.117) 
Cost of taking part in a 
demonstration (low) 
 0.147*(0.064) 0.227** (0.069) 0.229**(0.072) 0.180*(0.083) 0.102 (0.086) 0.281**(0.098) 
       
Constant -2.609*** 
(0.396) 
-3.456***(0.505) -6.895***(0.860) -6.190***(0.897) -6.757***(0.971) -9.687***(1.234) 
       
Log pseudolikelihood -501.572 -452.593 -386.196 -328.104 -302.903 -242.102 
0F.HOYLH	=DYRLQD¶V 
Pseudo-r
2 
0.343   0.332 0.491 0.578 0.532 0.709 
AIC 1037.145 939.185 820.393 716.208 665.806 544.204 
BIC 1119.398 1021.547 935.489 859.877 809.475 687.873 
N 933 939 894 888 888 888 
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APPENDIX 
 
Definition of Variables 
Dependent Variables 
 
1. Opposition to Austerity Programme 
7RZKDWH[WHQWGR\RXVXSSRUWRURSSRVHWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VDXVWHULW\SURJUDPPH"  
(1) Strongly oppose, (2) Oppose, (3) Neither support nor oppose, (4) Support, (5) 
Strongly support 
[Recoded: (1) Strongly support, (2) Support, (3) Neither support nor oppose, (4) 
Oppose, (5) Strongly oppose] 
2. Support for Protest 
I will read out some things people have said about the economic measures. To what 
extent do you agree or disagree with each of them?  
 e. People should fight against the measures 
(1) Strongly disagree, (2) Disagree, (3) Neither agree nor disagree, (4) Agree, (5) 
Strongly agree 
 
3. Protest Opportunity 
In protest against the austerity measures.. 
a) Have there been strikes in the town or community where you live? (1) No (2) Yes 
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c) Have there been any demonstrations in the town or community where you live?  
(1) No (2) Ye 
 
[Recoded as:   (0) Neither strikes nor demonstrations in town or community; (1) 
Either strikes or demonstrations; (1) Both strikes and demonstrations 
 
4. Actual Protest Participation 
 
In protest against the austerity measures.. 
a) Have there been strikes in the town or community where you live? (1) No (2) Yes 
b) If so, have you taken part in any of these strikes?  (1) No (2) Yes 
c) Have there been any demonstrations in the town or community where you live?  
(1) No (2) Yes 
d) If so, have you taken party in any of these demonstrations?  
e) Did you take part in any demonstrations outside your town or community?  
 
[Recoded as:  
Strikes: (0) not taken part in strikes (1) taken part in strikes 
Demonstrations: (0) not taken part in demonstrations (1) taken part in demonstrations 
(either in or outside their town or community, or both) 
Protest:  (0) not taken part in any strikes or demonstrations (1) taken part in either 
strikes or demonstrations or both 
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Independent Variables 
 
I. Relative Deprivation 
 
1. Personal Financial Situation 
&RPSDUHGWRD\HDUDJR\RXUILQDQFLDOVLWXDWLRQLV«0XFKZRUVH; (2) A bit 
worse; (3) About the same; (4) A bit better; (5) Much better  
[Recoded, scale 1 (Much better) to 5 (Much worse)] 
 
2. Economic Expectations 
How do you think the economy will be in 12 months?  
(1) Much worse; (2) A bit worse; (3) About the same; (4) A bit better; (5) Much 
better 
[Recoded, scale 1 (Much better) to 5 (Much worse)] 
 
3. Blame 
Who is to blame for the crisis? How responsible for the crisis would you say each of 
the following is?  
j. Each and every one of us  
(1) Not at all responsible; (2) Slightly responsible; (3) Somewhat responsible; (4) 
Moderately responsible; (5) Extremely responsible 
 
[Recoded:  0 all other responses 1 Not at all responsible] 
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4. Distribution of Burden 
I will read out some things people have said about the economic measures. To what 
extent do you agree or disagree with each of them?  
(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) 
Strongly agree 
b.  The burden of the measures is not distributed fairly to all citizens 
 
II. Biographical Availability 
 
1. Age 
In which year were you born?  
[Age computed as 2010-year of birth] 
 
2. Gender 
What is your gender?   1. Male 2. Female 
[Recoded Female 0; Male 1] 
 
3. Marriage status 
What is your marital status?  (1) Married; (2) Living with partner (but not married); 
(3) Widowed; (4) Divorced/Separated; (5) Single (never married).  
[Recoded as 0 Widowed/Divorced/Separated/Single; 1 Married or Living with 
Partner] 
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4. Children 
Do you have children?  (1) Yes; (2) No 
[Recoded 0 No 1 Yes] 
 
5. Education 
What level of education have you completed or are currently studying for? (1) 
Primary school; (2) Secondary (3 years); (3) Secondary, Lyceum (6 years); (4) Post-
secondary trade/vocational school; (5) University, undergraduate; (6) University, 
postgraduate); (7) Nothing 
[Recoded as: 0 Primary to Post-secondary trade/vocational school; 1 University, 
undergraduate and postgraduate] 
 
 
III. Networks 
 
1. Employment Status 
What is your current employment status?   
(1) Full-time (more than 30 hours per week); (2) Part-time employment (less than 30 
hours per week); (3) Self-employed; (4) Homemaker; (5) Student; (6) Retired; (7) 
Unable to work; (8) Unemployed 
 [Recoded as:  (0) not in full-time employment;  (1) in full-time employment] 
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2. Employment Sector 
Which type of organization do you work for?  
(1) Private sector firm or company; (2) Public sector employer; (3) Charity/Voluntary 
Sector (e.g. charitable companies, churches, NGOs, trade unions); (4) Never worked 
[Recoded as:  (0) not in public sector; (1) public sector employer] 
 
3. Membership of Political Parties, Trade Unions and Voluntary Organizations 
Are you yourself or anyone else in your household a member of any of the following 
organizations?  
(a) A political party 
(b) Trade Union or Labour Organization 
(c) Voluntary Organization (e.g. neighbourhood group, churches, cultural 
groups, non-governmental organizations etc.) 
(1) Yes, I am; (2) Yes, someone else is; (3) Yes, both me and someone else are; (4) 
No 
[Recoded as:  (0) No and Yes, someone else is; (1)  1 Yes I am, and Yes, both me and 
someone else are] 
 
4. Previous Protest Involvement 
3ULRUWRWKHFXUUHQWHFRQRPLFFULVLVGLG\RXLQWKHODVW\HDUVHYHUWDNHSDUW«>,I
yes, how often?] 
a. In a strike 
b. In a public demonstration 
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(Yes, once  1; Yes, 2-5 times 2; Yes, more than 5 times 3; No 4) 
[Recoded as: (0) no; (1) once (2); 2-5 times; (3) more than 5 times] 
 
 
IV. Ideology 
 
1. Left 
 ,QSROLWLFVSHRSOHVRPHWLPHVWDONRIµOHIW¶DQGµULJKW¶:KHUHZRXOG you place 
yourself on this 0-10 scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?  
0 Left ± 10 Right 
[Recoded as: 
0 5-10; 1 0-4] 
As item non-response was quite high, an attempt was made to enter a value for the 
left-right scale for these missing cases on the basis of two attitude questions which 
have generally been regarded as providing a good approximation of left-right 
position: 
Q. It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income 
between people with high income and those with low incomes 
43ULYDWHHQWHUSULVHLVWKHEHVWZD\WRVROYH*UHHFH¶VHFRQRPLFSUREOHPV 
(Scale: 1 Strongly disagree; 2 Disagree; 3 Neither agree of disagree; 4 Agree; 5 
Strongly agree).  
Those who take a position of either/or pro-redistribution and anti-private enterprise 
and do not take an anti-distribution and pro-private enterprise position are coded 1 
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(left wing), others are coded 0 (centre right); 3 cases with no response on either 
question were coded as missing. 
 
 
2. Voting  
And which party did you vote for in the last general election of October 2009?  
3. KKE 
4. Syriza 
[Recoded: 0 other voters and non-voters 1 KKE and Syriza voters] 
 
3. Postmaterialism 
If you had to choose between the following things, which of them would  you say 
should be the coXQWU\¶VILUVWSULRULW\"$QGZKLFKRQHZRXOG\RXVD\VKRXOGEHWKH
FRXQWU\¶VVHFRQGKLJKHVWSULRULW\" 
1. Maintaining order in the nation 
2. Giving people more say in important government decisions 
3. Fighting rising prices 
4. Protecting freedom of speech 
 
[Coded as:  0 Materialists; 1 Mixed-Materialists; 2 Mixed-Postmaterialists; 3 
Postmaterialists;  
Note:  Those giving preference to options 1 & 3 are classified as materialists, those 
choosing 2 & 4 are postmaterialists; other combinations are classified as mixed, with 
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the nature of the first option determining whether they are coded as mixed-
materialists or mixed-postmaterialists] 
 
V. Rational Choice 
 
1.Effectiveness of participating in demonstrations and strikes 
 0DQ\SHRSOHKDYHSURWHVWHGDJDLQVWWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VDXVWerity measures in recent 
months. How effective do you think each of these actions is in pressing for changes?  
a. Attending demonstrations 
b. Joining in strikes 
(1) Not at all; (2) Slightly effective; (3) Somewhat effective; (4) Moderately effective; 
(5) Extremely effective 
 
2. Cost of taking part in a demonstration 
7RZKDWH[WHQWGR\RXDJUHHRUGLVDJUHHZLWKWKHIROORZLQJ« 
d. Taking part in a demonstration could cause me to be injured or arrested 
  
(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) 
Strongly agree 
[Recoded: (1) Strongly agree; (2) Agree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Disagree; 
(5) Strongly disagree] 
 
VI. Control variable (Table 3) 
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1. Place of Residence 
How would you describe the place where you live?  
(1) A big city; (2) The suburbs or outskirts of a big city; (3) A small city or town; 
(4) a country village; (5) A farm or home in the country 
 
[Recoded as:  (1) A country village or a farm or home in the country; (2) A small city 
or town or the suburbs or outskirts of a big city; (3) A big city] 
 
 
 
 
